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ABSTRACT
A growing body of research literature deals with the debt policy 
decisions of companies. Although the subject of corporate capital 
structure has been intriguing scientists for a number of years, very 
little research has been conducted on the sample of companies in 
an emerging market environment such as Croatia. The objective of 
this article is to identify the main determinants of capital structure 
in case of large companies in Croatia during the period from 2001–
2010. The chosen set of explanatory variables is driven by firm-
specific (internal) characteristics and is additionally extended by 
macroeconomic (external) features. The results obtained by dynamic 
panel data methodology reveal that neither of the two competing 
theories exclusively and completely explain the financing behaviour 
of the analysed companies, and that inflation and development of 
the banking sector are important factors that affect the corporate 
leverage level.
1. Introduction
Corporate capital structure theories have emerged to explain corporate financing choices 
(debt-equity mix) and the consequent effect of these decisions on the corporate value. 
By the inclusion of the real-world conditions – agency costs, costs of financial distress 
and information asymmetry, modern capital structure theories developed, such as trade-
off theory (static and dynamic), signalling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) and 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In addition to these relevant 
theories, models that approach the capital structure problem from the aspect of corporate 
control have developed (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Stulz, 1988; Israel, 1992), as well as models 
based on the industrial organisation theory (i.e. Titman, 1984; Sarig, 1988). Although the 
main theories in their fundamental forms are based on the contrary predictions, empirical 
results are not unambiguous. Different theories identify a number of firm-level features, 
or internal factors, that affect the firm leverage, such as size, asset structure, profitability, 
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liquidity, tax, growth opportunities, age, product uniqueness, dividend pay-out policy, free 
cash flow and ownership structure (Harris & Raviv, 1991). However, the empirical results 
are not consistent with respect to the direction and strength of the relationship between 
the corporate leverage and its determinants meaning that there is no universally applicable 
capital structure theory.
Additionally, Frank and Goyal (2003) have concluded that roughly 30% of differences 
in the capital structure inside the country could be explained by internal determinants. 
This presupposes that there are additional influencing capital structure factors possible not 
included in the trade-off and pecking order theories (Črnigoj & Mramor, 2009), or other 
external or country-specific factors that affect supply of financing and hence influence cor-
porate financing decisions (De Haas & Peeters, 2006). Acknowledging the importance of 
the specifics of the broader environment in which companies operate, new and expanding 
areas for better understanding of corporate financial decisions is open, which enables a 
more comprehensive overview of the nature of different impacts on the corporate capital 
structure. In spite of this argument in favour of the importance of country’s environment, 
the corporate capital structure determinants are in general most often examined in terms 
of firm-level characteristics. This is especially true for emerging countries such as Croatia, 
that are rarely examined, most often as a part of broader set of countries with very low 
number of companies included (i.e. de Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008). Furthermore, studies 
that have included Croatia in examining financing decisions (i.e. De Haas & Peeters, 2006; 
de Jong et al., 2008), are performed over the time span up to 2005, thus, it is necessary to 
conduct a more recent study (an extended period) in order to reveal the capital structure 
of Croatian companies incorporating recent changes and developments.
The objective of this article is twofold. The first aim is to explore the main firm-specific 
(internal) determinants of corporate capital structure in order to evaluate the validity of 
dominant capital structure theory. The second aim is to expand the set of potential influential 
variables in order to evaluate the influence of country-specific (external) characteristics, 
namely macroeconomic factors, on corporate capital structure. Thus, this article contrib-
utes to the scarce empirical literature regarding capital structure determinants of Croatian 
companies taking into consideration both firm-specific and macroeconomic potentially 
influencing factors. Furthermore, the analysis is performed on panel data encompassing 
111 large companies during the 10-year period.
The article is organised as follows: the second section discusses the determinants of cor-
porate capital structure based on the underlying theories and empirical evidence. Section 
3 describes data and methodology, and section 4 presents the results of the research. The 
main conclusions are summarised in section 5.
2. Literature review
Modern capital structure theory encompasses two dominant theories – trade-off theory 
and pecking order theory. The trade-off theory argues that companies choose their optimal 
level of debt by trading off the benefits of debt financing against its costs. The benefits of 
debt financing include the tax deductibility of interests (Miller, 1977; Modigliani & Miller, 
1963) and the reduction of free cash flow agency costs of equity (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1990). The costs of debt relate to the costs of financial distress, and 
the agency costs of debt. The optimal level is achieved where the marginal benefits equal 
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the marginal costs of an additional unit of debt. The alternative pecking order theory is 
based on the information asymmetry between the firm’s insiders – either shareholders or 
managers, and outsiders – mainly investors, regarding the real value of both current oper-
ations and future prospects. For that reason, external capital (debt and equity) will always 
be relatively costly compared to internal capital (retained earnings). The main prediction 
of this theory is that companies follow the hierarchy of preference with respect to financing 
resources – they will first use retained earnings as the cheapest source of finance, followed 
by debt finance, and finally outside equity financing as a last option. Due to the fact that 
equity entails larger information asymmetry costs due to which is more expensive relative 
to other financing sources, it is less interesting to firms and serves them as a last resort. 
However, despite the important contributions of both these theories in understanding the 
capital structure decisions, neither of them gives definite answers to questions about how 
companies should be financed.
Most of the empirical studies on capital structure determinants employ models which 
involve the regression of the observed leverage ratio against a number of microeconomic 
or firm-level explanatory variables. These firm-specific characteristics assume to proxy for 
the underlying forces that drive these theories and represent the above mentioned market 
imperfections such costs of financial distress, information asymmetries and taxation. Table 1 
summarises central predictions of the two major capital structure theories – the trade-
off theory and the pecking order theory, regarding the relationship between the leverage 
ratio and the firm-specific factors which are suggested as determinants of capital structure 
(leverage).
As it can be seen, trade-off theory and pecking order theory have no common predic-
tions for most of the typically used proxy variables. The listed internal factors are included 
among the Frank and Goyal’s (2009) major factors that are driving forces behind capital 
structure decisions (‘the core model of leverage’). Thus, our first aim is to test empirically 
whether leverage decisions of firms follow the trade-off or the pecking theory predictions.
Profitability is usually taken as firm-specific attribute that clearly distinguishes between 
these two theories. The trade-off theory predicts a positive influence of profitability on lev-
erage as a result of bankruptcy costs, taxes and agency costs. First, expected costs of financial 
distress decline with profitability increase because more profitable firms can support more 
debt. Second, it pays off to profitable firms to have more leverage since interest payments are 
tax deductible and firms can realise tax savings through the use of additional debt. Finally, 
higher leverage helps to control agency problem of free cash flow by forcing managers to 
pay out more of the excess cash instead of spending it inefficiently (Jensen, 1986; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The use of higher leverage can serve as a signal of optimistic future of 
the company (Ross, 1977).
Table 1. central predictions of two dominant capital structure theories.
source: authors’ expectations according to theoretical assumptions.




non-Debt tax shields negative -
Growth (opportunity) negative Positive
Earnings volatility negative negative
Liquidity Positive negative
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In contrast, the pecking order model (Myers, 1984) predicts negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage as a consequence of hierarchy of financing due to the 
adverse selection costs associated with new equity issues in the presence of information 
asymmetry. Firms that have higher operating profitability have more earnings that they 
can potentially retain to finance their investments. Thus, profitable firms need less external 
financing and have lower leverage.
Tangible asset can be used as collateral or can be sold in case a firm has problems meeting 
its debt obligations. According to the trade-off theory, a higher share of tangible assets means 
lower bankruptcy costs and lower agency costs as debtholders can more easily secure their 
claims (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, a firm holding more tangible assets faces lower 
agency costs and finds it optimal to hold more debt. The pecking order theory (Myers, 
1984) assumes that firms prefer debt over equity due to the fact that debt is considered 
more secured and has less agency costs. Thus, positive relation between tangibility of assets 
and leverage is predicted.
The effect on firm size is ambiguous. The trade-off theory predicts that bankruptcy costs 
decline with firm size. Accordingly, an inverse relationship between size and the probability 
of bankruptcy is expected and hence a positive relationship between size and leverage. In 
line with arguments of Titman and Wessels (1988), larger firms tend to be more diversi-
fied, which lowers the probability of default implying positive size-leverage relationship. 
According to the viewpoint of the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), company size can 
be regarded as a proxy for information asymmetry between company insiders and capital 
markets. As a result, larger firms are better able to overcome information asymmetry than 
smaller firms, thus they can obtain external financing, both debt and equity, more easily.
Depreciation works as a non-debt tax shield and can be considered alternative to debt 
tax benefits (De Angelo & Masulis, 1980).1 Firms that have more depreciation expenses 
as a proportion of total assets have less need to use debt interest payments as a mean of 
reducing their tax base (Byoun, 2008). In other words, higher non-debt tax shields reduce 
the potential tax benefits of debt – hence, a negative effect is expected between non-debt 
tax shields and debt level.
One aspect of agency problem relates to the incentive of management of levered compa-
nies to engage in asset substitution activities and underinvestment (i.e. Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The debt-related agency costs are higher for firms with more growth opportunities. 
Accordingly, the trade-off theory predicts that companies with more investment opportu-
nities have less leverage because they are more motivated to control the managers’ oppor-
tunistic behaviour and to avoid underinvestment and asset substitution that can arise from 
shareholder–bondholder agency conflict. This is further supported by free cash flow theory 
argument (Jensen, 1986) which predicts that firms with more investment opportunities 
have less need for the disciplining effect of debt payments to prevent managerial funds 
misuse. The predictions of pecking order theory are ambiguous. On one hand, in its simplest 
form, it suggests positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage because 
debt typically grows when investment exceeds retained earnings suggesting that firms with 
rapid growth opportunities need more debt due to the lack of internal funds. However, in 
a more complex version of the theory, managers are interested in future as well as current 
financing costs. Balancing both costs, companies with large expected growth opportunities 
can maintain a low-risk debt capacity in order to avoid financing future investments with 
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new equity (or even forgoing profitable investments). Thus, firms with larger expected 
investments will have less current leverage.
With respect to earnings volatility (business risk), both theories allow for the same, neg-
ative prediction but with different argumentation. Firms with high earnings volatility face 
a higher risk that earnings drop below the debt service commitment. This may force firms 
to arrange funds at high costs to pay the debt or to bankrupt in an extreme case. However, 
if financed with equity, firms can choose not to pay out dividends during the period of 
financial distress. This indicates that firms with high earnings volatility will borrow less and 
prefer equity to debt when facing external financing choices. Thus, an inverse relationship 
between volatility and leverage is expected. According to De Angelo and Masulis (1980), 
for companies with volatile cash flows investors cannot accurately forecast future earnings 
based on the publicly available information. For that reason, market demands a premium 
to provide debt. Moreover, in order to reduce the possibility that it would not be able to 
realise profitable investments when cash flows are low and to reduce the necessity for issuing 
new equity, companies with volatile cash flows maintain low leverage. Thus, pecking order 
theory predicts negative relationship between company’s leverage and cash flows volatility.
Liquidity refers to the company’s ability to meet its short-term obligations.  A highly 
liquid company has a better ability to meet short-term liabilities which implies a positive 
relationship between liquidity and debt level. On the other hand, according to the pecking 
order theory, firms prefer internal to external financing. High liquidity firms can create 
liquid reserves from retained earnings and consequently have the choice to finance their 
projects with internal funds instead of debt. Hence, liquidity is expected to be negatively 
related to leverage. Moreover, in regards to agency theory, liquidity of the company’s assets 
can be used to show the extent to which these assets can be manipulated by shareholders 
at the expense of bondholders. This implies a negative relationship between liquidity and 
debt level.
Most theoretical and empirical studies of capital structure have examined the cases of 
companies in the developed countries such as the US. Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) cross-sec-
tion analysis is one of the first attempts to test for other developed (G7) countries the 
theoretical and empirical lessons learnt from the studies conducted in the US. The authors 
find similar levels of leverage across countries and the results of study indicate that the 
determinants of capital structure that have been reported for the companies in the US – 
size, growth, profitability, and asset tangibility, are important in other countries as well. In 
other words, capital structure decisions of the developed countries companies are similar 
to those of the companies in the US and support the assumptions of several modern the-
ories of capital structure (e.g., the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory). However, 
recent studies (i.e. Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007) performed on the companies in develop-
ing – transition and emerging countries (i.e. Central and East European [CEE] and Asian 
companies), show different results and support the assumptions of so-called ‘new pecking 
order theory’, which states that firms use as financing sources, first retained earnings, then 
equity, and finally, debt. These differences are caused by different firm-specific factors and 
different macroeconomic and institutional settings in developing and developed countries.
The issue of capital structure determinants in the context of transition and emerging 
economies, which have far more different macroeconomic and institutional environment, 
has received more attention in recent years. The institutional diversity entails for example, 
large differences in the aspects of a country’s financial system, legal system and tradition, 
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tax system, etc. Well known and cited studies by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999), Claessens and Klapper (2005) for example, highlight the presence of 
systematic differences in the capital structure across countries. These studies show how legal 
system and financial market development, as the components of the wider environment 
in which the companies operate, play an important role in the way the firms are financed. 
Different institutional features in various countries may impact the trade-off between bank-
ruptcy costs and tax benefits as well as the information asymmetry costs for firms. Also, 
companies operating in countries with higher distress costs need more collateral relative 
to companies operating in lower distress costs environment. In higher distress costs coun-
tries, lenders can repossess collateral or enforce debt contracts to reduce bankruptcy and 
agency costs of debt. The more developed financial system (banking system and/or finan-
cial markets) implies better supply of external financing for companies in financial deficit 
as well as less information asymmetry between investors and companies due to stronger 
regulation, higher corporate governance standards and better investor protection rights. 
Therefore, firm-specific characteristics as well as the characteristics of their environment, 
such as the general health of the economy, the size and the development of the banking 
system and/or capital market, legal environment, etc. influence the companies’ decision to 
use more debt or equity.
The focal point of this article is on the influence of firm-specific factors and country’s 
macroeconomic features on the corporate leverage. Studies focusing primarily on the effects 
at the micro level have documented common determinants of capital structure. However, 
some of those firm specific determinants – such as investment, sales volume or future growth 
opportunities, may vary upon the current state of the economy. During an economic trough, 
there are more future investment and growth opportunities available to firms, compared 
with an economic peak. This suggests that companies should adjust their capital structure 
according to the fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions in order to respond to future 
investment and growth opportunities. Stulz (1990) states that, due to managers, share-
holders’ agency problem and the resulting overinvestment and underinvestment problems 
connected with the amount of resources under management control, firms would use more 
debt when cash flows are high and when the possibility that the company will have free cash 
flows is high. When cash flows are high, management tends to invest largely in projects with 
negative net present value (NPV) (overinvestment); on the contrary, when the cash flows 
are low, there are no sufficient funds to invest in positive NPV projects (underinvestment). 
Beside the above mentioned, Stulz (1990) states that chosen financing policy can reduce 
these potential problems – issuing debt that forces management to pay out funds when cash 
flows are high reduces overinvestment problem, and issuing equity to increase the resources 
under management control when cash flows are low can reduce underinvestment problem. 
Therefore, according to the agency theory, the company’s leverage will be positively related 
to the macroeconomic conditions.
The asymmetric information theory has somewhat opposite conclusions about the impact 
of free cash flows and profitability on capital structure decisions. Asymmetric information 
between the managers and outside investors assume that the latter are less informed about 
the value of the company’s asset. Consequently, this inequality in available information 
can lead to under-pricing of equity and then underinvestment occurs. Ross’s (1977) sig-
nalling theory states that company’s decision to use debt investors interpret as a signal 
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of positive future opportunities and company’s prospect. In addition, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argue that there is a pecking order in financing with the use of equity as a last resort 
option. Moreover, it is better for firms to maintain financial surplus for future investment 
opportunities. Thus, due to information asymmetry problems, companies tend to use debt 
rather than equity financing during an economic trough. To conclude, according to the 
asymmetric information theory, the company’s leverage will be negatively related to the 
macroeconomic conditions.
Korajczy and Levy (2000) find that a company’s choice on security issuance depends on 
the macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific variables and conclude that for that reason 
companies tend to timely adjust the issuance of securities to periods of favourable macroe-
conomic conditions. An economic intuition behind the above mentioned arguments is that 
economy’s business cycle phase is an important determinant of capital structure decisions. 
Moreover, the results of some research have implied that the firm’s speed of adjustment 
toward a target level is faster under favourable macroeconomic conditions (Drobetz, 2006; 
Hackbarth, Miao, & Morellec, 2006).
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) assume the impact of macroeconomic conditions on capital 
structure taking into consideration a company’s financial constraints. Their results confirm 
that the corporate leverage is counter-cyclical for the financially unconstrained firms, which 
is not consistent with the agency theory of capital structure.
Hackbarth et al. (2006) propose that balancing the tax benefit of debt and bankruptcy 
costs in order to reach optimal leverage should depend on macroeconomic conditions. The 
benefits of debt – interest deductibility and mitigation of agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders, depend on the economy’s business cycle since economic expansion or 
recession has important implications for the companies’ cash flows. Further, costs of debt 
– bankruptcy costs and agency conflicts between debtholders and shareholders, depend 
on the probability of default and loss given default both of which should depend on the 
current state of the economy.
Levy and Hennessy (2007) develop a general equilibrium model to explain corporate 
financing over business cycles. They argue that capital structure is counter-cyclical for 
less-constrained companies. From the above, it can be concluded that there is consensus 
on the importance of macroeconomic circumstances for corporate financing decisions. 
However, there is no agreement on the nature of the impact of these conditions on corporate 
capital structure. Thus, there is a need for further research to provide better understanding 
on the impact of macroeconomic specifics on the capital structure decisions and this article 
addresses this gap to provide further evidence in the case of companies in Croatia.
Bopkin (2009) examines the effect of macroeconomic factors on capital structure deci-
sions of emerging markets companies. The results point to significant influence of the bank-
ing sector development on the use of long-term debt over equity. Inflation has a negative 
but statistically insignificant effect on capital structure decisions and GDP per capita has 
a negative and statistically significant relationship with capital structure variables. Interest 
rate positively influences the choice of short-term debt over equity.
As it has already been pointed out, the greater interest for the empirical examination of 
theoretical predictions and capital structure determinants in case of companies in transi-
tion and/or CEE countries has arisen in the last decade (Klapper, Sarria-Allende, & Sulla, 
2002; Nivorozhkin, 2004; 2006; Berk, 2007; Delcoure, 2007; Črnigoj & Mramor, 2009). 
The empirical literature on the capital structure issue in the context of Croatian companies 
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is still scarce.  A study of De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2006) is one of the multi-country 
studies where Croatia is included among 42 countries with, however, only 13 companies, 
which is the smallest number of observations of all sample countries. Similar is evident in 
the representation of other CEE countries which raises the need for deeper investigation of 
these indicative results. There are only a few studies on capital structure issues conducted in 
the Republic of Croatia. Baran and Zorić (2005) investigate firm-specific determinants of 
leverage of small and medium enterprises, but on the aggregated data for Croatian Counties 
in the year 2004. Učkar (2007) explores the functional relationship between financial struc-
ture elements and stock price movements of selected listed companies in Croatia during the 
period 2000–2006. The results confirm the explicative power of trade-off theory. The same 
model does not find evidence for confirmation of the traditional approach, the Modigliani-
Miller theory and signal theory of financial structure management. Penavin and Šarlija 
(2010) investigate the occurrences in capital structure flow of Croatian companies in the 
pre-recession period from 2002 to 2007. The results show that there are two common ways of 
changes in the capital structure in the observed period. The first is one in which own funds 
grow through retained earnings, while funds from borrowed sources grow faster which in 
the end indicates a change in the capital structure through debt increase. The second one, 
present in a smaller number of companies, is represented with a combination of the capi-
tal structure change in which own funds grow through increased retained earnings faster 
than comparing to borrowing. Furthermore, analysis for the period 2002–2007 shows that 
borrowing from banks is the dominant form of financing. The explanation for the observed 
situation can be found in the excessive costs of capital in the market, insufficient effects of 
the tax shield, as well as in the relative underdevelopment of the capital market in Croatia. 
Thus, as the suggestions for future deeper investigation of this issue, the authors underline 
the need for exploration of internal capital structure determinants in Croatian companies 
as well as macroeconomic conditions in which companies operate.
From the above, it can be concluded that the gap exists in the empirical literature relating 
to the capital structure issue of Croatian companies. Furthermore, previous research has 
not been adjusted for the panel nature of the data and thus full potential on information 
utilisation about the same unit of observation could not be achieved which ultimately might 
result in misleading conclusions. Our article contributes to the limited empirical literature 
by bridging the detected gaps.
3. Data and methodology
The sample of 111 large companies (LSE) in Croatia has been extracted from the population 
of all companies in Croatia available in the AMADEUS database in November 20112. The 
observed period is between 2001 and 2010. According to the AMADEUS database criteria, 
large companies are defined as those with equal or more than 10 million EUR of operating 
revenue or 20 million of total assets or 150 employees. Enterprises with ratios operating 
revenue per employee or total assets per employee below 100 EUR are not included in 
the category of large companies. From the population of all large companies available for 
Croatia, these selected 111 had to satisfy the criteria that observation has a known value 
in the AMADEUS excel spreadsheet in at least eight out of 10 observed years for the firm 
specific variables used in the analysis, and that there are known values for the mentioned 
variables in the period 2008–2010. This criterion is necessary due to the model requirements 
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and is in accordance with suggestions of previously conducted (and already mentioned) 
studies that use a similar sample of CEE countries’ companies. The final sample is strongly 
balanced. The data on economic development, inflation and banking sector development 
are obtained from World Development Indicators.3
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model.
With respect to leverage, as the main variable of interest, the data show that the compa-
nies have the leverage level of 65.5% on average. Minimum value of the leverage is 0 while 
the highest value of leverage is 221.3%. Standard deviation of the variable has value 25.4%.
The correlations for the data used in the analysis are presented in the Table 3. The magni-
tude of the correlation coefficients (Table 3) indicates that multicollinearity is not a potential 
problem in the regression models.
The panel character of the data allows us to use panel data methodology for this empirical 
research. This type of the analysis can control for firm heterogeneity and reduce collinearity 
among the observed variables (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995). To estimate 
the dynamic regression models, a two-step General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
is used which enables us to eliminate unobservable individual effects and the explanatory 
variables used in the research. Several tests will be performed to test the validity of the 
model – consistent results of an estimator are achieved under the assumption that there is 
no second order correlation in the first-differenced residuals and that instrumental variables 
are uncorrelated with the residuals. Thus, we use tests for first order (m1) and second order 
(m2) serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals as well as Sargan test for checking 
the validity of instruments.
The used panel data model can be represented with the following expression4:
 
The subscripts i and t represent company and year respectively. LEVi,t-1 is the one-period 









are sets of firm-specific and macroeconomic variables, respectively. Finally, eit are 
unobserved firm-specific effects and the error term.
The dependent variable is leverage calculated as total liabilities to total asset. This is the 
broadest version of this ratio and its use is determined by the availability of the financial 
statement data. Explanatory variables are approximated and measured as presented in the 
following Table 4.















variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Leverage 0.655 0.254 0.000 2.213
tangibility 0.444 0.247 0.000 1.000
Return on assets 0.100 0.127 -1.141 0.950
sales growth 2.008 31.153 -1.000 921.668
Liquidity 3.712 43.029 0.004 1360.000
size 1.66e+07 2.19e+07 48840 1.40e+08
non-debt tax shield 0.054 0.061 0.000 0.698
GDP 6017.42 6017.42 6017.42 6017.42
inflation 3.74 1.17 1.02 6.09
Domestic credit provided by banking sector 65.03 11.09 45.57 82.20
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With regard to macroeconomic variables, we employ GDP per capita, inflation and 
domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP which is a proxy for 
the level of banking development.
The results of GMM estimators are presented in Table 5 in the next section.
4. Empirical results
The regression results on the effect of firm-specific and selected macroeconomic factors on 
capital structure are presented in Table 5. Performed tests prove the validity of the model 
– there is no first-order (m1) or second-order (m2) serial correlation and instrumental 
variables used in the model estimation are valid since there is no correlation between the 
instruments and residuals (Sargan test).
The regression results on the effect of firm-specific factors on capital structure (Table 
5, Model 1) suggest highly significant influence of all internal factors except for the asset 
tangibility and non-debt tax shield. The estimated parameters for the lagged dependent 
Table 4. Dependent and explanatory variables and their measures.
acalculation of possibly better proxies for growth opportunities - such as tobin’s Q, was not feasible due to the lack of nec-
essary capital market data.
source: authors’ definitions according to existing empirical studies.
variables Measures
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total asset
tangibility Ratio of fixed asset to total asset
Growtha (in sales) (salest – salest-1)/salest-1
Profitability Ratio of EBitDa to total asset
Liquidity (current ratio) Ratio of current asset to current liabilities
size total asset
non-debt tax shield Ratio of depreciation to total asset
Gross domestic product per capita GDP per capita
inflation inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
Domestic credit provided by banking sector Domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP
Table 5. Determinants of capital structure (Gmm system estimator).
a***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. standard errors are in parentheses.
source: authors’ calculations.
Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable: Leverage Dependent variable: Leverage
Explanatory variables coefficients (standard errors)a coefficients (standard errors)a
constant  0.148 (0.157)  0.002 (0.1797)
Leverage(t-1) 0.170*** (0.071) 0.2142*** (0.067)
tangibility -0.122 (0.354) -0.327 (0.427)
Profitability (Roa) -0.0035* (0.002) -0.0035* (0.002)
Growth  -0.022*** (0.008)  -0.017* (0.010)
Liquidity  0.027*** (0.004)  0.029*** (0.005)
size  -0.001* (0.005)  -0.001** (0.005)
non-debt tax shield -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
GDP -0.000 (0.000)
inflation 0.0162* (0.009)
Domestic credit provided by banking sector 0.0039** (0.002)
number of instruments 15 18
sargan test (p-value)  0.2355  0.4048
First-order correlation (m1) (p-value)  0.0599  0.0488
second-order correlation (m2) (p-value)  0.1623  0.1279
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variable and liquidity are statistically significant and positive, while parameters for other 
statistically significant variables are negative. In order to find an answer on which theory 
best reflects the capital structure of the companies in Croatia, the direction of the influence 
of the significant variables will be compared to the suggested predictions according to the 
trade off and pecking order theories (see Table 1).
Negative but statistically insignificant coefficient of tangibility suggests an inverse rela-
tionship between the proportion of tangible assets as a firm-specific characteristic and the 
leverage meaning that tangible asset as collateral does not pose an effective guarantee against 
bankruptcy. This result is in contrast to the results of the studies conducted in developed 
countries, which obtain a positive relationship, but is consistent with the results of the studies 
performed on the sample of developing countries (i.e. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2001; Črnigoj & Mramor, 2009; Nivorozhkin, 2004). According to Nivorozhkin 
(2004), two factors suggest weak or no relationship between tangibility and leverage in 
CEE countries: underdeveloped and inefficient legal systems that may hinder the creation 
of enforceable debt contracts, and thin and illiquid secondary markets for firms’ assets that 
create uncertainty about their ‘recoverable’ market value. The negative tangibility–leverage 
relationship can be explained by the maturity structure of debt liabilities – the companies 
match the maturities of their assets and liabilities and the higher proportion of tangible 
assets corresponds to the higher level of long-term debt financing but not necessarily to total 
debt financing. This phenomenon may be expected to be more profound in the emerging 
markets of CEE countries where the lack of long-term debt financing (but the presence of 
the short-term one) may result in the negative relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
In line with the predictions and results of the De Haas and Peters’ study (2006), conducted 
on the sample of transition countries, our results confirm negative relationship between the 
proportion of tangible assets and the leverage measured by the proportion of total liabilities 
in total asset. However, this effect is not statistically significant.
As predicted by the pecking order theory, firm size is found to negatively correlate with 
leverage suggesting that larger firms are less leveraged. Previous studies in the transitional 
countries usually report a positive relationship (i.e. Byoun, 2008; Črnigoj & Mramor, 2009) 
which can be attributed to lower bankruptcy costs for larger firms (trade-off theory), their 
better transparency towards investors and consequently less severe problems of informa-
tion asymmetry (pecking order theory), or possible to existence of soft budget constraints. 
Klapper et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between size and actual leverage for all the 
countries they study; however, the authors only use 1999 data. Delcoure, (2007) observes 
anegative relationship for the estimation of long-term leverage and ascribes it to the exist-
ence of information asymmetry and still developing laws, due to which companies acquire 
more funds through short-term loans, and to underdeveloped bond markets. The negative 
size-leverage relationship in our study may be explained by more internal funds available 
for financing and less need for borrowing.
Profitability is negatively related to leverage which is in accordance with the hierarchy 
of financing, namely the pecking order theory. More profitable firms have more internally 
generated funds available and thus less need for debt. This negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage is confirmed in various studies (i.e. Booth et al., 2001; Črnigoj 
& Mramor, 2009; De Haas & Peeters, 2006; Delcoure, 2007; Nivorozhkin, 2004). Another 
explanation for this result could be related to the assumptions of the ‘new pecking order 
theory’ (Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007). According to this theory, banks from the developing 
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countries provide short-term loans rather than long-term loans, thus firms have to finance 
their investments with equity. However, in these countries shareholders’ protection laws are 
weak and managers prefer retained earnings as financing resource. This can be linked to the 
above elaborated results on the tangibility–leverage relationship. Moreover, these results are 
in line with the observations of Penavin and Šarlija (2010) on the occurrences in the capital 
structure flows in case of Croatian companies during period 2002–2007.
Growth possibility shows negative impact on the companies’ leverage meaning that as 
the companies grow more, less debt they use. Companies that have a greater opportunity 
to grow have a wider range of potential projects in which they can invest. As a result, their 
shareholders have greater flexibility in selecting these projects and expropriating wealth to 
the detriment of creditors – banks and bondholders. In other words, because of the higher 
agency costs of debt, companies prefer equity financing because potential lenders are unwill-
ing to lend funds for fear of exploitation of shareholders who are prone to choosing risky 
projects (trade-off theory). The agency problem of free cash flow is present in the mature 
and less growing businesses, and it can be reduced by additional debt (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This explains the negative relationship between the growth of the company and its 
debt. These results are consistent with the majority of research conducted in CEE countries 
and developing economies (i.e. Huang & Song, 2006; De Haas & Peters, 2004).
Liquidity positively affects leverage and this relationship is statistically significant. Higher 
liquidity, on the one hand, reduces the possibility of economic failure and lowers the poten-
tial costs of bankruptcy if it eventually occurs due to a sufficient amount of short-term asset 
to cover outstanding liabilities. On the other hand, better liquidity increases the liquidation 
value of the company, thus increasing its borrowing capacity in the future.
Depreciation as a non-debt tax shield is negatively related to the leverage level. However, 
we do not find evidence of an incentive to increase leverage because of corporate taxes, as 
the non-debt tax shield variable enters none of the regressions significantly.
On the basis of the observed results it can be concluded that neither trade-off or pecking 
order theory completely and undoubtedly explains corporate capital structure in Croatia. 
Taking into account the assumptions behind these two capital structure theories on the one 
hand, and the specific economic environment and resulting behaviour of firms on the other 
hand, this is actually not so surprising. The results of our analysis coincide with the results 
and conclusions of the mentioned researches conducted in other CEE countries (i.e. Črnigoj 
& Mramor, 2009; Delcoure, 2007; Nivorozhkin, 2004). Furthermore, the results point to the 
importance of understanding and deeper analysis of the country-specific characteristics 
of the environment.
With respect to the added macroeconomic variables (Table 5, Model 2) – gross domestic 
product per capita, inflation and domestic credit provided by banking sector, the results 
suggest positive and highly significant influence of inflation and domestic credit provided 
by banking sector, whereas the influence of gross domestic product is negative but statis-
tically insignificant.
Variables of GDP never enter the model significantly, probably reflecting the fact that we 
have already taken into account investment opportunities at the firm level through the firm 
growth. The negative coefficient of GDP shows that increase in economic activity reduces 
the companies’ leverage. Such an unexpected result is contradictory to the majority of pre-
vious studies that positive correlation between GDP and level of debt arguments with the 
‘healthier’ environment in which the risk of financial distress/bankruptcy is reduced which 
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motivates companies to increase debt financing (i.e. Booth et al., 2001; Bartholdy & Mateus, 
2006). However, if we look at the GDP in a way that it reflects the growth of the company 
and an increase in retained earnings, then the logical consequence of a negative relation 
is in accordance with the confirmed positive connection between growth (as measured by 
sales growth) and indebtedness.
The impact of inflation on debt is positive and statistically significant. The increase in 
inflation reduces the costs of debt financing and within the financial structure of the com-
panies it is expected to increase the proportion of borrowed funds. Moreover, the value of 
tax deductions is higher when (expected) inflation is higher (Frank & Goyal, 2007).
The domestic credit provided by banking sector as a share of GDP, which is used as a 
measure of the development of the banking sector, influences companies’ leverage positively 
and statistically significantly. Since this indicator measures the banking sector depth and 
financial sector development in terms of size (WDI, 2011, p. 285), the positive relationship 
is expected and it points to the higher degree of companies’ dependence on banking sector 
financing. In other words, more developed banking system facilitates access to external 
financing and consequently increases the companies’ leverage.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been twofold: first, to disclose specific internal company 
characteristics that are most influential determinants of corporate capital structure in case 
of large companies in Croatia, and second, to expand the set of internal determinants 
with the macroeconomic factors and to investigate their influence on corporate financing 
decisions. The results obtained applying dynamic panel methodology show that modern 
capital structure theories are to a certain extent relevant in Croatian context, namely par-
tially explaining capital structure choices. With respect to macroeconomic factors, higher 
inflation and more developed banking sector increase corporate leverage.
The results of the research can serve financial managers and macroeconomic policy 
decision-makers. Financial managers should become aware of the impact of these factors, 
to understand their significance and their implications on the financial structure of the 
company. Good financial decisions should take into consideration all of the relevant factors, 
not only internal or firm-specific. Only in this way it is possible to achieve a significant 
competitive advantage, which is extremely important in today’s dynamic environment of 
increasing competition and crisis prone times. Decision-makers on a macroeconomic level 
should be aware of the effect of the macroeconomic environment features on corporate 
capital structure policy and ultimately corporate performance.
This study helps to reveal the nature of corporate financing in Croatia and by producing a 
number of insights could form a basis for both further research in Croatia and comparative 
research in other developing countries. In Croatian context, suggestions for future research 
would relate to inclusion of other macroeconomic variables, such as exchange rate volatility 
and the level of openness of the economy, as well as deeper investigation of the effect of 
other financial system segments’ characteristics – capital markets, insurance sector, etc. 
on corporate leverage. Furthermore, the model should be expanded by other factors that 
characterise institutional environment in which companies operate, such as tax, legal and 
political systems. Having in mind the differences between large, small and medium compa-
nies and depending on data availability, the comparative analysis with respect to different 
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firm sizes can be performed. Additionally, the capital structure dynamics, target leverage 
and adjustment speed can be relevant topics for future empirical works.
Notes
1.  Apart from depreciation, other non-tax shields could be allowances for research and 
development and investment tax credit (De Angelo & Masulis, 1980).
2.  The financial sector is excluded, as in similar research, due to its specificities and particular 
requirements of the supervisors.
3.  This comprehensive World Bank database, available on World Bank’s Open Data site, among 
various the most current and accurate data series (1300 time series indicators) encompasses 
numerous economic and financial data at national level (214 economies) (World Bank, 2015).
4.  We run the regression for two different model specifications: in the first (basic model), we 
use only firm-specific variables and in the second model we expand this set with inclusion 
of macroeconomic variables. Table 5 summarises results for both models.
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